The relatively wide spreads observed for many NASDAQ stocks has recently been linked to an implicit agreement among dealers to avoid quoting prices in odd-eighths. Others maintain that wide spreads and scarcity of odd-eighth quotes are a natural consequence of NASDAQ's institutional structure, and that traders are compensated on non-price dimensions such as immediacy, depth, and payment for order flow. This paper assesses the welfare effects of NASDAQ dealer behaviour, exploiting the fact that dealers in five major stocks suddenly introduced odd-eighth quotes and narrower spreads in response to allegations of collusion in mid-1994. Investors in these stocks bear the full cost of transacting under both the wide and narrow-spread regimes, and will trade more in the regime which offers them better overall terms. After correcting for NASDAQ-wide and other exogenous determinants of volume, we find that the introduction of odd-eighth quotes produces a statistically significant but economically small volume increase. If transactions demand has an absolute elasticity of at least one-half, as suggested by studies of tax changes, the practice of avoiding odd-eighth quotes for Amgen, Apple, Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft transferred just over $1700 from traders to dealers over an average day of trading. While the transfer would increase to nearly $90,000 per day if demand elasticity were only -0.01, the deadweight losses do not exceed $80 per day. Analysis of 125 stocks whose dealers either introduced or withdrew odd-eighth quotes from 1990-94 produce a similar conclusion. Christie and Schultz (1994) document a scarcity of odd-eighth quotes for a significant number of NASDAQ stocks, which they attribute to an implicit agreement among dealers to maintain supercompetitive spreads. The most compelling evidence in favour of this collusion hypothesis is presented in Christie et al (1994) who find that dealers in five highly visible stocks began quoting in odd-eighths after summaries of Christie and Schultz' (1994) findings appeared in the business press. Christie et al (1994) also find that quoted and effective spreads decreased when dealers began quoting in odd-eighths.
1 The wide-spread outcome can, in principle, even Pareto-dominate that with narrower spreads and fewer services. Grossman and Miller (1988) suggest that the lower bound on spreads imposed by minimum tick rules serves to compensate the providers of continuous liquidity. Those dealers who maintained even-eighth quotes may have simply chosen an appropriate, larger minimum-tick. More generally, the argument that high prices at the retail end of a business help to increase service and quality is well-established as a defense of "resale price maintenance" [see Telser (1960) for the "special services" argument in franchising and Johnsen (1994) for an application to the case of soft-dollar brokerage commissions].
2 flow, features such as immediacy, depth, and quality of advice are difficult to capture empirically. 2 More important, while a strictly legal analysis may focus on the presence or absence of actual collusion between dealers, the key economic issue is whether investors are harmed by what the Securities and Exchange Commission recently dubbed the dealers' "pricing convention" (SEC, 1996 pp. 17-23) . The relevant question is therefore the dollar value that investors in a given stock place on NASDAQ services other than quoted spreads. 3 Even a large observed reduction in such elements as immediacy and depth would not establish whether investors were made better or worse off when dealers began offering more odd-eighth quotes.
This paper exploits the fact that we can observe investors' response to the changes documented by Christie et al (1994) . If Christie and Schultz (1994; 1995) are correct that restricting quotes to even-eighths artificially raised the true cost of transacting, cessation of the practice will increase volume so long as the demand for trading is not completely inelastic. It is well-known that trading volume increases roughly in proportion to the reductions in transaction costs produced by deregulation or lower taxes on trading. 4 Effectively, we are using traders'
response to a sudden change in quote convention to ascertain whether the wide spreads associated with the pre-existing practice of avoiding odd-eighth quotes primarily "taxed"
investors to enrich the dealers, or whether the "tax" supported a set of auxiliary services and inducements which were of value to traders.
As with any market, the volume of trade in a firm's shares depends on many factors besides the prices bid and offered. Our contention is that the change in quoted spreads documented by Christie et al (1994) present a powerful experiment. Even critics of Christie and Schultz (1994) such as Kleidon and Willig (1995) acknowledge that the fall in observed spreads for Apple, Amgen, Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft was a response to an exogenous piece of adverse publicity 3 rather than a change in the underlying costs of market-making. While the publicity-driven changes present a relatively clean experiment, there are only five affected stocks. We therefore repeat our analysis on a sample of 125 stocks identified by Christie and Schultz (1996) in which dealers either initiated odd-eighth quotes and lowered spreads, or withdrew odd-eighth quotes and widened spreads, over the period 1990-1994. 5 Since the change in quote behaviour is unlikely to be exogenous, the larger sample is more likely to be contaminated by changes in market fundamentals.
Our results for the five "clean" regime shifts are as follows. A simple comparison of average dollar trading volumes before and after the fall in spreads shows a statistically significant increase only for Amgen. Volumes in Cisco actually fell, as did a simple average over all the affected stocks. After correcting for overall NASDAQ volume as well as price, absolute return, and time-of-day effects, however, we find an overall statistically significant increase in volume.
While we are confident that the volume change is positive, it is far smaller than expected based on the dramatic narrowing in spreads. Spreads fell by over 40% but we estimate a volume increase of less than 1%. If dealers did not in fact engage in non-price competition, transaction demand must have been almost completely unresponsive to cost, with an absolute elasticity of just over 0.0033. If the absolute elasticity of demand is at least one half, as suggested by studies of tax changes, then the data imply that traders enjoyed only a small reduction in the full cost of transacting. The practice of avoiding odd-eighth quotes would in this case have transferred less than $2000 from investors to dealers in an average day of trading, at a deadweight loss of just over $1.50.
Estimated volume changes and implied changes in net transaction costs are even smaller for the 125 stocks where dealers suddenly changed quote behaviour. We conclude that investors did gain when dealers introduced odd-eighth quotes, but that this gain was substantially muted by a reduction in other dimensions of transaction quality and service. In addition to the question of how large numbers of dealers could have coordinated their pricing decisions, our results underscore the importance of future research on the multidimensional nature of competition between dealers and between exchanges.
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Section I of the paper shows why the change in volume is directly related to the gains, if any, enjoyed by investors who are suddenly offered odd-eighth quotes and narrower spreads.
Section II estimates the actual change in volume for the five publicity-affected stocks, accounting for the effects of the time-of-day, day-of-week, lagged volume, price level, absolute returns, and the average volume for a NASDAQ index. Section III assess the results for alternative assumptions about the elasticity of transactions demand. Section IV analyzes the larger sample of 125 stocks and Section V concludes.
I. Why Volume Changes are Informative
Christie et al (1994) document a dramatic change in spreads which is not explained by standard measures of the costs that dealers bear in executing a transaction. They also show that there was little exit of dealers from the market. While Christie et al (1994) interpret this as evidence that dealers were pressured to surrender at least some of their excess profits, a plausible alternative is that dealers adjusted other dimensions of service or pricing to maintain their profits at a competitive level. The pricing and delivery of transaction services is complex, and competition between dealers may have been fierce along dimensions other than the spread. Quoted and even effective spreads may not reliably characterize the costs that investors actually bear when they buy or sell shares.
We maintain that the observed volume of transactions in the stocks that change their quotation practices is a useful measure of the extent to which the practice of avoiding oddeighths represented a producer conspiracy against consumer interests. Consider the following sylized model of excessive spreads supported by the avoidance of odd-eighth quotes, which we calibrate to actual data in Section III. Assume that the true price of the stock is known to be $40 and transaction costs are small (in particular, less than the minimum tick of $1/8) but non-zero so that even perfectly competitive dealers will not quote a bid and ask of $40. If competition between dealers is constrained only by the minimum tick of $1/8, the bid quote will be $39.875 and the ask quote will be $40.125. If dealers can agree to quote only in even-eighths, however, the ask price rises to $40.25 and the bid price falls to $39.75.
In this extreme case, dealers' excess profits for a round-trip transaction represent at least half the observed spread. If "jawboning" by regulators and the exchange induces dealers to begin quoting in odd-eighths, investors will gain at the expense of dealers from the fall in 5 spreads. Moreover, if transaction demand is at all price-elastic there will also be an overall welfare gain. Figure 1 presents the simplest case, where public buyers and sellers are both equally price-sensitive. We do not distinguish between informational and liquidity motives for trade since the issue under investigation is whether dealers were charging spreads that exceeded the cost of executing a transaction, inclusive of any adverse selection problems they may encounter. In Figure 1 , the practice of avoiding odd-eighth quotes transferred $243.75 (= 1950*$0.125) from traders to dealers at a deadweight loss of $1.5625.
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[ Figure 1 goes here]
Our discussion thus far assumes that the practice of avoiding odd-eighth quotes was a pure collusive agreement and that dealers are unable to offer special inducements to attract order flow at artificially wide spreads. To capture the effects of such multidimensional competition, suppose that traders receive inducements worth δ dollars per share when spreads are wide, and that such inducements are removed when spreads narrow due to the introduction of odd-eighth quotes. 7 A value of δ equal to the fall in spreads would indicate that traders did not enjoy any net gain from the introduction of odd-eighth quotes. A value of δ less than zero would indicate that increased competitive pressure forces dealers to improve their services as well as their quotes.
To keep matters simple, we assume that δ is the same for all traders, regardless of their willingness to trade and whether they are on the buy or sell side. 8 The net fall in the transaction costs borne by a buyer or seller when dealers introduce odd-eighth quotes is thus (0.125 -δ). Table I summarizes the change in key market variables for different values of δ.
[ Table I goes here]
Four distinct hypotheses can be distinguished by the importance of special services. If δ is zero or even negative, then dealers were engaged in simple collusion and the inflated spread was entirely monopoly profit. If δ falls between zero and $0.125, then dealers competed on dimensions other than quoted spreads, but not so vigorously as to produce a net cost to traders which is as low as if spreads had been quoted in odd-eighths. If δ is exactly $0.125, traders are indifferent between the wide-spread and the narrow spread regimes. If δ exceeds $0.125, wide spreads were part of an efficient set of business practices and traders are made worse off by the change to narrower spreads. Unfortunately, the special services and inducements characterized by δ are not directly observable. As Table I shows, however, volume is directly related to δ and to the welfare implications of the narrower spreads. We now estimate the actual volume changes in order to calibrate the model.
II. Actual Changes in Volume for Amgen, Apple, Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft

A. Simple Comparison of Means
Using intraday data supplied by the Institute for the Study Securities Markets (ISSM), Table II compares average spreads and volumes for the 45 days before and the 45 days after the key dates identified by Christie et al (1994) and Christie and Schultz (1995) . We consider alternative-length windows below. Volume is measured as the average value of shares traded per half-hourly interval before and after the key date indicated, spreads are measured as the mean daily (dollar) bid-ask spread, and the NASDAQ index represents changes in market volume.
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The t-statistic reported is for the hypothesis that the two means are equal. Results are reported on both a pooled and stock-by-stock basis.
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[ Table II goes here]
The evidence on spread changes confirms the dramatic fall documented by Christie et al (1994) . As indicated earlier, volume did not show the dramatic increase that would be implied by such an apparent collapse in transaction costs. Apple experiences a large volume increase but it is less than proportional to the spread decrease. Amgen has no discernible change, and Cisco's volume falls quite sharply. Intel arguably exhibits a weak overall (combined) increase in volume, since the large volume fall in the first event was not associated with such a large change 7 in spread and because the fall was subsequently reversed. Average volume over the 45 days after the second Intel spread fall is over 18% greater than that before the first spread fall.
The volume data reported in Table II , while suggestive, almost certainly understate the positive effect of the spread changes. Compared to the 45 trading days before May 27, 1994, the 45 days after the publicity driven spread decline saw a reduction in volume on NASDAQ shares of more than 7%, which is also significant at the 99% level. Even if this fall is not in fact primarily a reaction to allegations of collusion, it still highlights the importance of controlling for exogenous determinants of volume.
B. Estimates Controlling for Other Determinants of Volume
Our regressions control for important exogenous factors which may have changed over the 45 days pre-and post-spread decline. Following Muelbroek (1992) Table III. [ Table III goes here]
The positive and significant coefficient on the Event dummy for the overall sample and for the individual stocks Apple, Amgen, and Microsoft tend to support Christie and Schultz ' (1994) contention that avoiding odd-eighth quotes served to enrich dealers at the expense of other traders on NASDAQ. Investors' subsequent trading behaviour suggests that they perceived a fall in the cost of transacting when dealers began offering odd-eighth quotes. The regressions do not 8 exhibit any obvious problems of serial correlation and, as suggested by the simple correlations in Table IV , the coefficients of interest are not subject to serious multicollinearity problems.
[ Table IV goes here]
C. Adjustment Costs and Timing of Volume Changes
To this point, we have assumed that dealers reduce their δ values and that traders adjust their order patterns within 45 days after the fall in spreads. One obvious alternative explanation for our findings is that while dealers did not cut back on services or inducements, traders took more than 45 days to fully respond to a radical fall in transaction costs. This explanation is based on the notion that dealers were simply unable to curtail such practices as payment for order flow, to reduce depths, or to redirect research attention away from the stocks which had become less profitable. While such extreme stickiness is not especially plausible, we are unable to offer a compelling model of the actual adjustment process. We therefore replicated our experiment for alternative windows of 15, 30, and 60 days before and after the spread reduction date. The results are summarized in Table V. [ Table V goes here] Table V presents some evidence of stickiness in that the volume response is essentially zero over the 15-day window. The robustness of our findings, however, is highlighted by the fact that the coefficient on the spread-reducing event never changes signs and that the coefficients over the 30, 45, and 60 day windows are statistically indistinguishable.
III. Assessment of the Results
While we are able to conclude that the volume increase is statistically different from zero, it is far smaller than would be expected if the true cost of transacting fell as radically as did the quoted spreads. The average fall in quoted spreads was on the order of 40%. The studies of deregulation summarized in footnote 3 suggest that we would observe at least a 20% increase in trading volume, if the fall in quoted spreads accurately portrayed the change in transaction costs.
Based on the coefficient for the Event dummy variable, Amgen experiences a volume increase of only 1.8%, which is the largest in the sample. Volume in the pooled sample increases by only 0.19%.
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Unfortunately, the observed volume response involves two unobserved quantities; the change in non-price competition and the elasticity of demand. If demand is highly inelastic, then we would expect only a small increase in volume even if non-price competition were nonexistent or irrelevant. If, on the other hand, demand is highly elastic, then traders must have experienced a substantial reduction in non-price inducements (δ) to have made such a small response to the change in quoted spreads. In Table VI we assess a wide range of pairs (δ, demand elasticity) which are consistent with the observed changes in volume and spreads. The elasticities in Table   VI refer to a linear demand curve's arc elasticity over the range of estimated volume change for the pooled sample, holding fixed the explanatory variables in Table III . Linearity is computationally convenient, and is also a reasonable approximation for the actual demand curve given the small change in volume.
[ Table VI goes here]
The results in Table VI The above dollar figures may be surprising given the resources devoted to the litigation associated with the odd-eighth controversy, but the dollar amounts at stake there were based on the legal assumption that dealers were in fact engaged in simple monopoly pricing. This corresponds to the row in Table VI where η = .0033. In this extreme case, dealers in Amgen, 12 The calculations are as follows. We assume that half-hourly volume before the change is Q = 13,286,903 and that volume after the change is Q' = a-bP' = 13,310,312, where P' = (narrow) dollar half-spread = .101 and δ is set at 0. Hence, δ = .073 -23,409/b or, more generally, δ = ∆Spread -∆Volume/b where ∆Volume is the square of the coefficient on Event in the pooled sample of Table III Apple, Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft were transferring over a quarter of a million dollars per day from investors at a substantial deadweight loss. With less extreme elasticities, our findings shed light on two more pertinent economic facts. First, as stressed by Christie et al (1994) , there is little evidence of exit by dealers after odd-eighth quotes were introduced. This would be expected given the small wealth transfers we estimate for most values of η. Also, there is no evidence of mass delisting from the NASDAQ as would be expected if traders in "flagship" securities were being grossly overcharged. Our results suggest that the overall pricing of transaction services was reasonably competitive during the wide-spread regime.
As mentioned earlier, the fact that dealers in Amgen, Apple, Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft were induced to move from a wide to a narrow-spread regime by an exogenous onslaught of adverse publicity provides a relatively clean experiment. Nonetheless, there are only five affected stocks. To check the robustness of our conclusions, we turn to a larger but undoubtedly "dirtier" set of regime shifts documented by Christie and Schultz (1996) .
IV. Analysis of 125 Changes in Quote Convention
Christie and Schultz (1996) identify 125 separate securities for which dealers suddenly initiated or withdrew odd-eighth quotes between 1990 and 1994. The changes are apparently a bona fide regime shift in that odd-eighth quotes effectively appear or disappear within a few hours. Moreover, while the shifts must be in some sense endogenous, Christie and Schultz (1996) show that they are not associated with obvious changes in the underlying costs of marketmaking. Table VII summarizes our key variables in the 45 days before and after the changes in quote behaviour.
[ Table VII goes here]
Overall, the results are quite similar to those for the five publicity-driven changes summarized in Table II . Spreads increase (fall) dramatically when odd-eighth quotes are withdrawn (initiated). The associated changes in volume continue to be modest and are actually much smaller than those observed for Amgen, Apple, Cisco, Intel, and Microsoft. This result could reflect the fact that the changes in quote behaviour reflect unobservable changes in the fundamental costs and benefits of wide versus narrow spreads.
Table VIII presents a more careful examination of the volume response to the changes in quote convention, using the same set of controls as in Table III . As with the univariate 11 comparisons, there is essentially no volume change to accompany the large spread changes. A puzzling result is that the volume response to the initiation of odd-eighth quotes is in the expected positive direction over the narrower windows but eventually becomes negative as the window expands. One potential explanation is that traders responded quickly to the fall in spreads while dealers only slowly withdrew non-price inducements to attract order flow. This is of course ad hoc and does not explain why we did not find a corresponding reversal for the withdrawal of odd-eight quotes. What we can confidently conclude is that there is very little volume response to the changes in quoted spreads.
[ Table VIII goes here]
V. Conclusions and Directions for Future Research
Our findings suggest that the collapse in spreads for Apple, Amgen, Cisco, Intel, and
Microsoft did not represent a simple breakdown of cartel pricing. Judging from the change in their willingness to trade, investors' gain from the increased frequency of odd-eighth quotes was substantially less than that implied by the fall in quoted spreads. While surprising, this result is consistent with recent evidence on the effect of reductions in minimum-tick rules on the AMEX (Ahn, Cao, and Choe, 1996) and Singapore (Lau and McInish, 1995) . Both authors find a sizeable reduction in spreads after minimum-ticks are reduced, but find no change in volume.
Bacidore (1996) finds similar results for the introduction of decimal pricing on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Our interpretation is that any profits that are generated by such rules, or by the implicit minimum tick rule displayed by NASDAQ dealers before May 1994, are to a large degree competed away by additional services and inducements. When spreads exceed the cost of executing a transaction, dealers can be expected to compete for order flow on dimensions other than the spread so that overall transaction costs are at relatively competitive levels.
Our approach focuses on how public traders respond to the change in dealers' practices. This is in stark contrast to regulators who apparently focus more on dealer behaviour and the way they may or may not compete with one another [see especially, SEC (1996) ] Our approach respects the fundamental fact that dealer behaviour and NASDAQ practices only have efficiency implications insofar as they affect users of the market. Nonetheless, there are ways our analysis could be extended or improved. For example, we have neglected the possibility that some types of traders gained and others lost when quotes were narrowed. One plausible hypothesis is that it 12 was primarily the larger, more sophisticated institutional investors who negotiated better deals within the wider, even-eighth quotes. Smaller, less sophisticated investors who took prices as given would thus have been the major beneficiaries of the introduction of odd-eighth quotes.
While neither we nor Christie et al (1994) found any dramatic change in average trade size, more detailed studies could add substantially to our understanding of competition between dealers and between exchanges. Table I Traders' Gains and Volume Changes when Spreads are Narrowed by $1/8 As a result of multidimensional competition between dealers, inducements are given to traders to secure order flow. δ represents the dollar value of such inducements which traders only receive when spreads are wide. Using the supply and demand functions defined in Figure 1 (see footnote 4), the gain to traders and the corresponding change in dollar volume due to a $1/8 narrowing of the spread is shown below. Since public traders are equally likely to be buyers or sellers, the resulting change in dollar volume is computed as $40 (frictionless price in Figure 1 ) times the change in number of shares transacted. Christie and Schultz (1994 & 1995) identify dates where bid-ask spreads decline significantly for the five stocks utilised below. Spread is the equally-weighted mean daily (dollar) bid-ask spread. Panels A through G verify these spread declines and document changes in mean values for several other variables around the event dates. Stock Volume and NASDAQ Index represent mean dollar values for individual stocks and the NASDAQ Index respectively. All variables, including Price and Return are mean values for half-hourly intervals (13 per day) over the 45 days pre/post event date. The 45 days pre-and post-spread decline are each divided into thirteen thirty-minute intervals. For each individual stock (and the pooled sample), the mean value of the following variables are calculated; (1) the dollar value of trade for the NASDAQ Index (equally weighted across all NASDAQ stocks), (2) the absolute value of cumulative returns (Abs Returns), (3) the dollar value of trade (Dol Vol), and (4) the one-period lag of dollar value of trade (Lag Volume). Since the distributions of these variables are skewed, the square roots are used to reduce the potential domination of outliers. Event is a dummy variable that is zero prior to the spread decreases, and one afterwards. Dol Vol is regressed against Event, NASDAQ Index, Abs Returns, and Lag Volume, plus dummy variables for the thirteen intervals (with interval ten omitted) and dummy variables for each day-of-the-week (with Thursday omitted). All t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) The days pre-and post-spread decline are each divided into thirteen thirty-minute intervals per day. For each individual stock (and the pooled sample), the mean value of the following variables are calculated; (1) the dollar value of trade for the NASDAQ Index (equally weighted across all NASDAQ stocks), (2) the absolute value of cumulative returns (Abs Returns), (3) the dollar value of trade (Dol Vol), and (4) the one-period lag of dollar value of trade (Lag Volume). Since the distributions of these variables are skewed, the square roots are used to reduce the potential domination of outliers. Event is a dummy variable that is zero prior to the spread decreases, and one afterwards. Dol Vol is regressed against Event, NASDAQ Index, Abs Returns, and Lag Volume, plus dummy variables for the thirteen intervals (with interval ten omitted) and dummy variables for each day-of-the-week (with Thursday omitted). All t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity using White's (1980) 
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Table VI Efficiency Gains and Wealth Transfers Due to The Introduction of Odd-Eighth Quotes
The arc elasticity in transaction demand is computed to generate a half-hourly volume increase from $13,286,903 to $13,310,312 for the given fall in net transaction cost, defined as the fall in half-spread, 0.731, less δ. The transfer from dealers to traders is daily volume before the spread change times the net reduction in transaction costs. The efficiency gain is the area under the demand curve taken over the observed change in volume and the implied change in net transaction cost. Christie and Schultz (1996) identify 125 stocks in which dealers either initiate or withdraw odd-eighth quotes between 1990 and 1994 (inclusive). The dates in which this bid-ask spread quoting convention changes is investigated. Panel A reports the results for events where odd-eighth quotes were withdrawn (58 events), and Panel B reports the results for events where odd-eighth quotes were initiated (67 events). The associated changes in bid-ask spread is documented below, and changes in mean values for several other variables around the event dates are also reported. Spread is the equally-weighted mean daily (dollar) bid-ask spread. Stock Volume and NASDAQ Index represent mean dollar values for individual stocks and the NASDAQ Index respectively. All variables (except Spread) are mean values for half-hourly intervals (13 per day) over the 45 days pre/post event date.
Variables
Pre-Change Post-Change t-statistic Christie and Schultz (1996) identify 125 stocks in which dealers either initiate or withdraw odd-eighth quotes between 1990 and 1994 (inclusive). The dates in which this bid-ask spread quoting convention changes is investigated. There are 58 events where odd-eighth quotes were withdrawn, and 67 events where odd-eighth quotes were initiated. The days pre-and post-quoting convention change are each divided into thirteen thirty-minute intervals per day. The mean value of the following variables are calculated; (1) the dollar value of trade for the NASDAQ Index (equally weighted across all NASDAQ stocks), (2) the absolute value of cumulative returns (Abs Returns), (3) the dollar value of trade (Dol Vol), and (4) the one-period lag of dollar value of trade (Lag Volume). Since the distributions of these variables are skewed, the square roots are used to reduce the potential domination of outliers. Event is a dummy variable that is zero prior to the spread decreases, and one afterwards. 
